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In this paper we document the diverging trends in volatility of the growth rate of sales
at the aggregate and ﬁrm level. The upward trend in micro volatility is not driven by a
compositional bias in the sample studied. We also show that many other ﬁrm level variables
display a similar upward trend in volatility. Finally, we argue that this new fact renders
obsolete the proposed explanations for the decline in aggregate volatility and that, given the
symmetry of the patterns at the micro and macro level, a common explanation is highly likely.
1 Introduction
The interest of macroeconomists in the volatility of macro variables has increased substantially in
recent years. McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000] have shown that since the mid 1980￿s the volatility
of aggregate sales has declined signi￿cantly. Blanchard and Simon [2002] show that indeed there is
a downward trend in volatility of GDP starting in the 50￿s with the exception of the 70￿s. Stock
and Watson [2002] analyze the time series of 124 macro variables since 1960 and show that the
decline in aggregate volatility, beginning in 1984, is pervasive. Reinforcing this evidence, the return
on some aggregate index like the S&P 500 was less volatile in the 80￿s and 90￿s than in the 70￿s.
Intriguingly, this downward trend in volatility is not observed at the micro level. Comin [2000]
￿nds that the volatility of individual stock returns has increased monotonically since the 1950￿s.
Campbell et al. [1999] ￿nd the same upward trend in the ￿rm-speci￿c risk. Comin [2000] also
￿nds that at the 2-digit manufacturing level, there is an upward trend in the excess job reallocation
rate between 1973 and 1993 (a measure of the degree of turbulence in the labor market) despite
1the fact that Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh [1996] ￿nd that at the aggregate level, the excess job
reallocation rate is ￿at. Also in the labor markets, Gotshalk and Moﬃt [1994] ￿nd that the wages
of the individuals in the PSID were more volatile in the 1980￿s than the 1970￿s.
This paper takes a careful look at the evolution of volatility of non-￿nancial variables at the ￿rm
level, as opposed to the markets, in order to validate the fact that micro and macro volatility have
followed diverging trends, at least, since the mid 1980￿s. To inspect this hypothesis, we analyze
the volatility of the growth rate of nominal sales for the ￿rms in the COMPUSTAT database. We
￿nd strong evidence of the diverging patterns of the volatility of the growth rate of sales at the
macro and micro level. To show that this ￿nding is robust, we conduct several checks in sections
3 and 4. First, we show that both cross-sectional and time series measures of micro volatility are
upward trending. An important issue when using the COMPUSTAT database is the possibility
of a bias due to the change in the composition of the sample. To establish that our results are
not driven by a compositional change, we show that the pattern holds for all the quintiles in the
distribution of sales, that it also holds once we remove the predictable eﬀect of age and size on the
￿rm-level volatility and, ￿nally, that the increase in micro-volatility is also robust to controlling for
￿rm-speci￿ca s p e c t s .
Once we have proved the diverging macro and micro trends in the volatility of the growth
rate of sales, we try to assess the pervasiveness of the pattern by turning our attention to other
COMPUSTAT variables like the share in net sales of pro￿ts, the cost of goods sold, general expenses,
interest expenses and labor costs. All of these variables display trends similar to the volatility of
the growth rate of ￿rm-level sales.
In section 5, we use our empirical ￿ndings to evaluate the explanations proposed to understand
the decline in aggregate volatility. These can be divided in two groups. The ￿rst group attempts to
explain the decline in macro volatility through mechanisms that lead to a decline of volatility at the
￿rm level and then, trivially, aggregate up the micro behavior. The second group of explanations
tries to explain directly the decline in macro volatility. Both of these approaches are unsatisfactory
in the light of the facts presented in this paper. The ￿rst is clearly at odds with the increase in
micro volatility. The second, though not completely inconsistent, is clearly insuﬃcient to account
per se for the upward trend in ￿rm-speci￿c uncertainty. To ￿ll this gap, in section 5 we propose a














































































































 Nominal Sales  Real Sales
Figure 1: Aggregate time series, rolling windows of standard deviations of growth rate of nominal
and real sales.
2 Macro Facts
We illustrate here the decline in volatility at the aggregate level. We start by examining annual
data on aggregate sales expressed in nominal and real terms. Growth rates for these variables, as





Then we compute a series of the standard deviations of 10-year rolling windows for both the
growth rate of nominal and real aggregate sales (i.e σt = σ(Xt−4 : Xt+5)). These series are plotted
in ￿gure 1.
Rolling window results for both the real and nominal aggregate sales variables show signi￿cant
declines in volatility beginning in the 1980￿s. As emphasized by Blanchard and Simon [2002] for
GDP, the time series for aggregate volatility can be better characterized by a secular decline that
started in the 1950￿s and was interrupted from the mid 60s through the 70s. Given the similar down-













































































































Figure 2: Micro time series, rolling windows of average standard deviations of growth rate of nominal
sales.
3M i c r o F a c t s
To investigate the evolution of the volatility at the micro level, we use the merged COMPUSTAT-
COMPUSTAT annual data base. We extract data on net nominal sales at the ￿rm level dropping
the ￿rms for which we do not have 11 consecutive observations. These represent a mere 3 percent
of the total sample. We then compute the rolling windows in a similar manner at the micro level.
After deriving the series of standard deviations across 10 year intervals for every ￿rm, these standard
deviations are averaged across ￿rms to arrive at the standard deviation for every year. Volatility at
the ￿rm level clearly exhibits a signi￿cant upward trend as illustrated by ￿gure 2. When examined
along with the data at the aggregate level, the diverging trends are quite evident (￿gure 3).
In order to acquire a more representative measure of volatility, we weight the standard deviations.
While averaging across ￿rms for a given year, the standard deviation of every ￿rm is weighted using
its sales as a share of total sales. As can be seen in ￿gure 4, the upward trend in volatility persists.
Another way to measure the volatility inherent in the ￿rm￿s environment is by focusing on the
cross-section instead of the time series. This involves computing standard deviations of growth
rates across all the ￿rms in a given year. Figure 5 re￿ects the steady increase in volatility at the
￿rm level.
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Figure 5: Cross section, average standard deviation of ￿rm level growth rate of sales.
as we claim, accurately re￿ect changes in the economy, the increased volatility may be a feature
speci￿c only to the sample in use. Our claims neccessitate discrediting the latter possibility.
The data set used was extracted from the COPMPUSTAT database for years 1950 through to
2000. The size of the sample increases drastically in the 70￿s raising some concerns regarding the
possibility that the upward trend in the ￿rm-level volatility is the consequence of compositional
bias. This may arise because the ￿rms that are incorporated in the data set in the post 70s
period, are more volatile than those that existed throughout either because the sector where they
operate is more volatile, or on account of some ￿rm speci￿c attribute like being younger or smaller.
The following section checks the robustness of the claimed upward trend in ￿rm level volatility by
controlling for compositional changes.
4 Robustness to test for composition
In order to show that the upward trend in micro volatility is not due to a compositional bias in the
sample studied, we conduct three exercises. First, we divide up the sample at any point in time
in ￿ve quintiles according to the level of sales and investigate whether the increase in volatility is
driven by any speci￿c quintile or holds across the board.
In ￿gure 6 we can appreciate that the ￿rm-level volatility has increased in all ￿v eq u i n t i l e sa so n e


































































































































1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Figure 6: Micro cross section, standard deviations of growth rates by quintiles
not neccessarily negate the compositional bias argument. In theory, given the higher probability of
sampling smaller ￿rms in the post 1970 period, all the quintiles may be composed to a larger extent
of smaller, more volatile ￿rms.
To further control for changes in composition, we focus our analysis on the volatility component
that is not predictable by the ￿rm-level characteristics that have changed in the sample. Specif-
ically, we run a pooled regression of the ￿rm-level standard deviations on a vector of the ￿rms
characteristics (Xit)a si ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) .
σit = α0 + α1 Xit + †
σ
it (2)
Then, we aggregate up the unpredictable component of volatility to come out with an equivalent
time series for the ￿rm-level volatility. As in the previous section, we consider both weighted and
unweighted measures of residual volatility, where the weights are given by the ￿rm￿s share in total
sales in the year. The ￿rst set of ￿rm characteristics we control for is composed of age and age
squared. With this we control for the fact that over time, the share of young (more volatile)
￿rms in sample has increased presumably faster than in the US economy. In ￿gure 7 we can see
that removing the volatility attributable to changes in age does not diminish the upward trend in
volatility.
Size is also an important determinant of ￿rm-level volatility. To control for the eﬀect of changes














































































































Figure 7: Controls; residuals from σit = α0 + α1 ageit + α2age2
it + †σ
it
tional variables in Xt.I n￿gure 8, we report the series of the residual volatility after having included
in Xt the ￿rm share of sales in GDP in addition to age and age squared. In ￿gure 9, we report
the evolution of residual volatility when we control for the share of ￿rm sales in the nominal value
added of the sector apart from age and age squared. In both ￿gures we can appreciate a prominent
upward trend in volatility, though in the weighted measures there is a ￿attening of the trend in the
80￿s and 90￿s.
The evidence presented so far speaks against the hypothesis that the observed upward trend in
￿rm speci￿c uncertainty is just the result of the inclusion in sample of a larger share of small or
young more volatile ￿rms since 1970. However, it can still be argued that factors other than size
or age induce higher volatility in the new population of ￿rms sampled leading to a compositional
bias. To rule out this possibility, we use ￿rm speci￿c dummies to eliminate the eﬀect of ￿rm
speci￿c variables (both observable and unobservable) on volatility. After removing this ￿rm speci￿c
component of volatility, we are left with the component that is orthogonal to any ￿rm characteristic
and, therefore, immune to any compositional bias in the sample. Note that, this exercise constitutes
a stringent test of the upward trend in micro volatility hypothesis. To illustrate this point, suppose
that the trend is due to the fact that new ￿rms in the economy are just more volatile. By removing
the ￿rm speci￿c component of all the ￿rms in sample, we would be eliminating the component that




















































































































Figure 8: Controls; residuals from σit = α0 + α1 ageit + α2age2





















































































































Figure 9: Controls; residuals from σit = α0 + α1 ageit + α2age2



































































































Figure 10: αt from the regression: σit = αi + αt + †σ
it
eﬀect in the regression is an informative exercise because if the upward trend still holds we can
claim that it is not due to a compositional bias in the sample studied.
Formally, we run the following regression where αi is a set of ￿rm speci￿c dummies and αt is a
set of time dummies. Figure 10 plots the series of αt.
σit = αi + αt + †
σ
it
It is clear from this picture that even after removing the ￿rm speci￿c component in volatility,
the upward trend persists. In the next section we investigate whether this pattern is common to
the volatility of other micro variables.
5O t h e r S e r i e s
Building non-overlapping measures of the volatility of monthly and annual stock returns over 10 year
windows for the ￿rms in the COMPUSTAT data set, Comin [2000] observed an important upward
trend in micro volatility. Table 1 reproduces his results. Column 1 illustrates a large increase in
the average volatility of individual stock returns, dated somewhere between the mid 60s and the
mid 70s, without any sign of decline through the 80s and 90s. This pattern is in stark contrast to
the evolution of the volatility of the returns on some aggregate index like the S&P500 described
10in column 2. There we can see that the increase in aggregate volatility experienced in the 70s was
followed by an important decline in the 80s and 90s.
As shown in the rest of the columns, the upward trend in micro volatility is robust to many
variations. Column 3 only considers those stocks with more than two years of data. Column 4
computes the median of the standard deviation of individual stock returns. Column 5 computes
the average across stocks of the standard deviation of the deviations from a stock and decade
speci￿c time trend. Column 6 computes the average standard deviation of yearly individual stock
returns. This measure is more immune to fads, bubbles and other non-fundamentals sources of
return variability. Reassuringly, its pattern is the same as in the other columns. One can, therefore,
conclude that the measured increase in the volatility of asset returns mostly re￿ects an increase in
the uncertainty of fundamentals.1
Again, this upward trend in ￿rm level volatility could be ascribed to an increase in the sample
in the share of small more volatile ￿rms. To control for this composition eﬀect, columns 6 and
7 compute the average standard deviation of individual stock returns for the ￿rms in sample in
the 50￿s and 60￿s respectively. Note that this approach could a priori bias the results against the
increase in volatility because of a selection eﬀect. Finally, column 8 reports standard deviations of
the individual stock returns weighted by the share in total capitalization over the decade.
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu [1999] have observed a similar upward trend in ￿rm-level
risk computed as the cross-sectional volatility of the component in ￿rm speci￿cr e t u r n st h a ti s
orthogonal to the return in the sector and in the whole market.
Comin [2000] has also observed micro turmoil and macro stability in manufacturing labor mar-
kets as measured by the excess job reallocation rate in the LRD. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh
[1996] report no trend in the annual aggregate excess job reallocation rate for the LRD. However, at
the 2-digit manufacturing level, Comin ￿nds that there is a signi￿cant upward trend in the excess
job reallocation rate.
COMPUSTAT also gives us a larger number of variables to investigate the prevalence of the
upward trends in micro volatility. In this section, we report results for the share in sales of pro￿ts,
of the costs of goods sold, of general expenses, of labor costs and of the cost of borrowing. For each
variable x and ￿rm i we compute the standard deviation of variable x in a ten year rolling window
1One could also argue that the increase in short term volatility is due to the faster trading methods available
since the 1970’s. However, the increase in volatility is robust to the length of the periods over which the returns are
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Figure 11: Rolling windows for the standard deviation of the share of variable X on net sales
a n dt h e nw ew e i g h tt h e s e￿rm speci￿c time series by the share of sales in total sales.
The examination of the evolution of these variables reinforces our claim of increase in ￿rm level
volatility as can be appreciated in ￿gure 11.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The US economy has experienced two opposite trends in several variables. At the macro level, these
variables have become less volatile, with an interruption of this trend during the 70s and early 80s.
At the micro level, however, the trend has been upwards, indicating that ￿rm level volatility has
increased. As we shall see next, this second fact has interesting implications for the evaluation of the
proposed explanations for the decline in aggregate volatility. Moreover, the striking symmetry of the
diverging trends makes it very tempting to pursue a common explanation (or set of explanations).
McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000] proposed that new inventory management methods, such
as just-in-time inventory management, are the source of the reduction in volatility in GDP. This
mechanism operates at the ￿rm level and, therefore implies that the volatility of net sales at the
￿rm level should decline too. This contradicts the evidence presented in this paper.
Another line of research argues that part of the decline in aggregate volatility is due either
to a reduction of the volatility of the shocks that hit the US economy or to an increase in the
12eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize these shocks (Boivin and Gianonni [2002], Clarida, Gali
and Gertler [2000], Congley and Sargent [2001], Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles [2002], Primiceri
[2002] and Sims and Zha [2002]. Though interesting and possibly true, these approaches cannot
constitute the primary mechanism to explain the decline in aggregate volatility since, in principle,
there is no reason to think that a decline in the aggregate volatility of shocks (or of their eﬀect on
the economy) is going to increase the uncertainty faced by individual ￿rms. This consequence is,
at the very least, not obvious.
This argument is consistent with Stock and Watson [2002]￿s conclusion about the fraction of the
decline that diﬀerent candidate explanations can account for. They claim that after considering
the reduction in the volatility of shocks and the increase in the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, at
least half of the decline in volatility remains unexplained.
Since we are skeptical of theories attempting to explain any one of the two symmetric trends in
isolation, we are going to devote the last paragraphs of the paper to sketch a new explanation to
the decline in aggregate volatility. One that very naturally explains at the same time the increase
in ￿rm level volatility.
The simplest way to understand our explanation is in the context of the Dornbush, Fisher,
Samuelson [1977] Ricardian trade model with trade costs (i.e. transport costs) and country speci￿c
productivity shocks. The force that drives the two divergent trends in volatility is a decline in
the trade costs.2 When this happens, the fraction of goods exported to the other countries rises
and therefore, the demand faced by the national ￿rms depends to a larger extent on the foreign
productivity shocks. If the national and foreign productivity shocks are not perfectly correlated,
the decline in trade costs is accompanied by a reduction in the volatility of GDP.
At the ￿rm level, a decline in the trade costs increases the possibilities faced the ￿rms: a larger
fraction of ￿rms can export their goods and capture international markets, but also a larger fraction
is susceptible of being driven out of the market by international competitors. This leads to a higher
volatility of the demand faced by the ￿rms and therefore to an increase in the volatility of sales.
In this way, a unique shock (namely, a decline in trade costs) can account simultaneously for the
decline in aggregate volatility and the increase in ￿rm level volatility.
2This same model can be relabeled to represent the integration of the US regions.
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